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Judicial Agenda Setting Through Signaling and 
Strategic Litigant Responses 
Vanessa Baird∗ 
Tonja Jacobi∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout its history, the United States Supreme Court has 
handed down many decisions that have shaped, and continue to 
shape, the character of public policy. The kinds of issues that have 
garnered the Court’s attention have changed dramatically over time, 
from cementing both national and judicial supremacy, to regulating 
the economy, to protecting unpopular minorities. The Supreme Court 
has ruled on a wide variety of political issues, a phenomenon that is 
arguably increasing due to what Tate and Vallinder1 call the 
 
 ∗ Vanessa Baird (Ph.D., University of Houston, 2000) joined the faculty of the 
University of Colorado in 2000 and she was appointed to the rank of Associate Professor in 
2007. Her book, Answering the Call of the Court: How Justices and Litigants Set the Supreme 
Court’s Agenda, infra note 7, was published in 2007 by the University of Virginia Press. Her 
research interests include understanding the process by which courts acquire legitimacy, the 
causes and effects of the perception of procedural justice, and the mechanism by which courts 
signal extra-judicial actors to extend judicial power. Her newest research focuses on the effect 
of political violence on non-violent political action in Russia, specifically with regard to using 
the judiciary for legal change. 
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 1. C. Neal Tate & Torjbörn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The 
Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1, 5 (C. Neal Tate 
& Torjborn Vallinder eds., 1995). 
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“judicialization of politics”: the tendency of courts to resolve issues 
that were once primarily decided by legislatures. Among the most 
common explanations for the expanding role of courts in making 
public policy is that legislatures have been overwhelmed with the 
complexity and number of issues and therefore abdicate their role of 
legislating in certain policy areas.2 Another conventional explanation 
is that activist justices are to blame.3  
Yet these theories are inadequate. Justices face a major 
institutional hurdle in judicializing issues throughout the American 
body politic: whereas legislatures can proactively set their agendas, 
courts can only hear cases that have been litigated. To prevent 
employment discrimination, for example, Congress can freely pick 
and choose among the variety of issues dealing with employment, 
such as equal pay, equal benefits, social security, preferential hiring, 
and wrongful firing. When Supreme Court Justices want to influence 
policy regarding employment discrimination, they must wait for 
cases that represent each one of those issues to be litigated. Whereas 
legislators are limited only by what other legislators will agree to put 
on the agenda, courts are dependent on actors outside the judiciary to 
present them with high quality cases for making comprehensive 
policy.  
The courts are seemingly dependent on litigants to set their 
agendas, a considerable limitation on their agenda-setting power and 
their broader influence over the development of law. When cases are 
not litigated or are settled out of court, courts do not have access to 
those issues. Moreover, since judicial policy-making is an iterative 
process, courts need multiple cases within the same policy area to 
make comprehensive policy. The puzzle, then, is that even though 
judges are dependent on outside actors for access to issues, we have 
 
 2. See generally RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF TWO AGENCIES 374 (2d ed. 1996); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE 
END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 125,300 (2d ed. 1995); 
ROBERT J. MCKEEVER, RAW JUDICIAL POWER?: THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY (2d ed. 1995); Tate & Vallinder, supra note 1, at 1–10; Christopher Z. Mooney & 
Mei-Hsien Lee, Legislating Morality in the American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion 
Regulation Reform, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 599, 621 (1995). 
 3. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW (1990); JEREMY A. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS 
PUBLIC POLICY (1989). 
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witnessed the expansion of judicial agendas—and thus judicial 
influence.  
The purpose of this Article is to present the theory and empirical 
evidence that strategic interaction between litigants and Justices 
transforms the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda. More specifically, we 
propose that Supreme Court Justices shape the Court’s agenda by 
providing signals to litigants about the sort of cases they would like 
to see, and litigants consider those signals when deciding whether or 
not to pursue a given case. First, we lay out a theory for why Justices 
would have an incentive to signal to litigants for particular kinds of 
cases. Then we describe how litigants are likely to respond to such 
signals and explain how those responses affect the Court’s agenda. 
Then we document the empirical evidence that changes on the 
Supreme Court’s agenda reflect indications of the Justices’ priorities, 
as well as the evidence that this process can aid Justices in achieving 
policy outcomes that they would not otherwise be able to achieve. 
We show that this signaling results in: more cases being brought in a 
policy area when Justices signal that the policy area is a judicial 
priority; and more cases being brought if those cases are likely to 
effect broad policy change. We also show that litigants respond to 
specific information about how to frame legal issues. For example, 
Justices can signal for future cases to be framed according to the 
balance of federal and state power, which then results in more cases 
being framed in this way. Moreover, we show that dissenting 
opinions can signal for a particular way of framing the case that 
makes the dissenting Justices more likely to be in the majority in the 
future. 
I. JUDICIAL SIGNALING 
Justices have priorities and preferences about what kinds of cases 
are brought to them. This is why certiorari decisions are predictable 
based on the relative legal or political importance of the cases in the 
certiorari pool.4 Some cases have specific legal and technical 
 
 4. See H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1991); DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT (1980); Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae before 
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qualities that make them preferable to others, such as the occurrence 
of a circuit split on an issue. Some issues are also preferable to 
others. Some cases make better policy-making vehicles than others, 
and some are better equipped to resolve current legal conflicts. As 
one Justice expressed the matter to Perry, if a Justice wants to hear a 
case in a certain area,  
[h]e says something [in an opinion] that might indicate that the 
Court would be willing to hear a case which brought up certain 
issues. We say this is something that we are not deciding here, 
but that it is something that the Court might want to resolve . . . 
I think generally that people are sometimes aware of what the 
Court or a justice might be interested in.5 
This quotation suggests that judges often wish to shape their 
agendas, and much judicial scholarship has attempted to answer the 
question of how they do so. Most of this scholarship has focused on 
judicial agenda shaping through institutional mechanisms, 
particularly manipulation of certiorari.6 A small but growing 
literature suggests that judges have another option: sending signals.7 
Signals are indications of judicial preferences, either for certain cases 
to be brought to the court, or for particular types of arguments to be 
 
the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990); Gregory 
A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 (1990). 
 5. PERRY, supra note 4, at 213.  
 6. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Lee 
Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United 
States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); John F. 
Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A 
Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335 (1990); Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1979); Glendon Schubert, Policy Without Law: An Extension of the 
Certiorari Game, 14 STAN. L. REV. 284 (1962). 
 7. See VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND 
LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA (2007); Vanessa A. Baird, The Effect of 
Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755 (2004); 
Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and 
Discretionary Review, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2006); Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling 
Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2008); Andrew P. 
Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court 
Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 63 (2005); Vanessa A. Baird & Tonja Jacobi, How the 
Dissent Becomes the Majority: Using Federalism to Transform Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2009). 
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made in cases that are brought. Signals can take many forms, from 
extrajudicial statements, such as speeches, to statements in an opinion 
in one case suggesting arguments the judge would be open to hearing 
in a future case. 
Signals are not the exclusive domain of higher court judges. 
Lower court judges can signal to higher court judges those cases 
which may be worthy of reconsideration,8 or lower court judges can 
send signals to extrajudicial actors to establish their merits for 
promotion.9 We focus here on signals from the Supreme Court 
Justices to litigants. 
The substance of these signals includes indications of judicial 
policy priorities. Policy entrepreneurs who litigate to achieve legal or 
policy change choose from a number of cases that they may support. 
To use the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) as an example, 
the Colorado ACLU receives about ten thousand calls a year from 
people who maintain that their rights or liberties have been violated.10 
About two thousand of those cases are serious violations. The Board 
then meets to decide which of those two thousand cases deserve 
financial or other support so that the cases can go to trial. When they 
make these decisions, they use information from previous decisions 
about how case facts can be used to make particular legal arguments 
that can help them push the envelope of legal change. This is how 
signals work—Justices provide information to help litigants decide 
which cases to pursue and how to frame the legal questions.  
The Court’s signals need not be—and indeed, are not—
monolithic. A simple way of thinking about it is that liberal groups 
pay attention to the five most liberal Justices to decide what 
arguments might appeal to them, and conservative groups use 
information from the five most conservative Justices. Both liberal and 
conservative actors should pay attention to the preferences and 
priorities of the Justices who are ideologically in the middle, since the 
identity of the median Justice may change depending on the issue or 
how that issue is framed. Policy entrepreneurs make their best guess 
when they choose which cases to support from among the cases that 
 
 8. Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 7, at 4–5.  
 9. Morriss, Heise & Sisk, supra note 7, at 67.  
 10. BAIRD, supra note 7, at 29.  
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they have before them, and thus will respond to signals about the 
Justices’ priorities as they are informative.  
There may also be more nuanced legal information. For example, 
Justices may signal not only their own support for an issue, but their 
expectations regarding their colleagues’ likely support for an issue.11 
Signals can encompass statements about the ripeness of an issue. An 
example is Justice Stevens’ unusually forthright statement that, 
having decided that execution of mentally retarded defendants is 
unconstitutional, “it would be appropriate for the Court to revisit the 
issue [of juvenile execution] at the earliest opportunity.”12 Another 
example is that, when a judge has failed to achieve a victory in the 
case at hand, he or she may signal a potential fissure in the majority 
or an alternative way of arguing a future case that will bring about a 
more positive outcome.13 But equally, signals can be more specific, 
such as suggesting a particular type of argument that will be most 
likely to sway the Court. One example of this is when a dissenting 
Justice mentions that the case should have been decided according to 
a different legal rationale than the one used by the majority. This is 
an example of what Riker calls “heresthetics”—when a political actor 
changes the dimension of the issue so that she can split the current 
majority, thereby creating a new majority that better matches her 
preferences.14  
The Justices have private information on the expected outcomes 
of future cases, as they know their own position and often have inside 
information on their colleagues’ expected positions.15 A Justice who 
seeks a case as a vehicle can signal his own support for a particular 
line of argument, as well as his view of the expected position of the 
rest of the Court. This is not to say that judicial signals will always be 
entirely reliable. Jacobi formally models how and when signaling will 
 
 11. Jacobi, supra note 7, at 5.  
 12. Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 13. Baird & Jacobi, supra note 7, at 5. 
 14. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION (1986). 
 15. See generally Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as 
Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 
J. POL. 824 (1995); Saul Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649 (1979); Gregory A. 
Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J. W. Zorn, Sophisticated Voting and Gate-keeping in 
the Supreme Court 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999). 
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occur and shows that under certain conditions Justices have an 
incentive to overstate the chances of success of some cases.16 When a 
Justice and litigant who each support a given side of an argument 
only want a case brought when that side will ultimately be successful, 
then the Justice will fully reveal as much information as possible in 
their signals. But a Justice may seek a vehicle to shape the law—to 
raise awareness, pressure another branch to act, or to generally agitate 
for policy change—even when the Justice knows the side he or she 
supports in the case at hand cannot yet succeed. Justices may be 
willing to sacrifice their interests in a given case in order to find a 
vehicle to direct the development of law and make it more likely that 
the argument they support will win in the long run. Although policy 
entrepreneurs may share this willingness, individual litigants will 
seldom be willing to invest in litigating an argument that will fail. As 
a result, in such a case, Justices will at times have an incentive to 
exaggerate the chances of success of the case. Judicial signaling, 
then, is informative but also highly strategic behavior. 
II. STRATEGIC LITIGANT RESPONSES 
Even if signals are not entirely reliable, they do convey 
information,17 and that information will be valuable to litigants 
weighing whether or not to invest in litigating a particular case. 
Litigants, then, have an incentive to pay attention to what the Justices 
want and bring the Court cases reflecting those desires. Our main 
argument here is that the incentive to support litigation in particular 
policy areas varies over time in accordance with litigants’ changing 
perceptions of Supreme Court Justices’ policy priorities. When the 
incentive to litigate in some area is strong, litigants or other policy 
entrepreneurs put their resources into finding cases that are likely to 
be appealing to Justices on the Supreme Court in policy areas that 
they perceive the Justices, or some majority subset of Justices, care 
about. For the purposes of this argument, whether Justices’ goals (or 
 
 16. Jacobi, supra note 7, at 30–31.  
 17. See David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s 
Vote, 9 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 229 (1992); Jan Potters & Frans Van Winden, Lobbying and 
Asymmetric Information, 74 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1992).  
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litigants’ goals) are legal or political is less important than whether 
strategic supporters of litigation are paying attention to the Justices’ 
signals of their goals—whatever they may be—and bringing the 
Justices the cases they can use to achieve those goals. Thus, through 
the use of signals, Supreme Court Justices create access to cases that 
otherwise might not be available. The empirical implication of this 
process is that the Supreme Court’s agenda, defined by its changing 
levels of attention to broad policy areas, will after some time come to 
mirror the preceding indications of Justices’ priorities.  
Of course, when selecting which cases to hear, Supreme Court 
Justices can choose from among thousands of petitions. So, why do 
they need litigants to respond to their priorities? The reason is that 
some cases are better than others in their presentation of legal 
doctrine, ideas, and case facts, because they have been framed in 
terms of the most recent cases handed down in those policy areas. 
And, if cases need to be specially constructed, someone must do 
this—someone from among the many interest groups and other 
policy entrepreneurs who spend resources finding, developing, and 
bringing cases to the Supreme Court. Unique cases with particular 
facts and sophisticated legal arguments are often necessary. Since 
identifying appropriate cases requires resources, it matters for 
Supreme Court policy-making power that sophisticated policy 
entrepreneurs have an incentive to spend their resources on 
identifying—or constructing—high-quality cases. 
The evidence suggests that legal or political entrepreneurs, 
defined as actors who desire to influence the “direction and flow” of 
political or legal change,18 support litigation in response to what they 
perceive are the policy priorities of Supreme Court Justices. Policy 
entrepreneurs scour the environment for cases with appropriate case 
facts that lend themselves to sophisticated and policy relevant legal 
arguments, and then support the litigation of the cases so that they are 
available to the Court. Without access to these cases, the 
development of the law in the Supreme Court would have a much 
more piecemeal character. So we expect that some time after Justices 
signal their interest in hearing particular types of cases, a 
 
 18. See Mark Schneider & Paul Teske, Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: 
Evidence from Local Government, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 737, 737 (1992). 
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significantly higher number of those cases will be brought to the 
courts and result in case outcomes. 
Judicial policy-making is like piecing together a jigsaw puzzle. 
Litigants who are paying attention to the Court’s signals know which 
pieces are missing and which pieces should come next. The more 
active litigant entrepreneurs are in bringing the missing puzzle pieces, 
the more likely the Court is to fill in the puzzle. The fuller the puzzle, 
the more voice the Court has over various issues and the more power 
the Court has over a wider variety of legal and political outcomes. 
This transmission of information may be the key to understanding the 
judicialization of politics.  
III. MEASURING THE BREADTH OF THE SUPREME COURT’S AGENDA 
According to the theory that the Supreme Court is dependent on 
outside actors for the comprehensiveness of its agenda, an ideal 
measure of the comprehensiveness of the Court’s agenda would be to 
develop a list of all the possible issues that the Supreme Court could 
hear and then determine the ratio of issues heard to issues that are not 
heard. Since there is no bound on all potential issues at any time, a 
count of the number of issues on the agenda in a particular policy 
area at any one time is a close approximation. It is essential to 
measure issue breadth in the context of specific policy areas, because 
if the justices have indicated that they consider a particular area to be 
a priority, then we should observe an increase in attention due to 
increased litigation in that policy area. We have identified eleven 
policy areas: First Amendment issues, discrimination, privacy, 
criminal rights and procedure, labor and labor union issues, the 
environment, economic regulation, taxation, due process or 
government liability, judicial power, and federalism. 
To create a count of cases, we examine all cases from 1953–1997, 
obtained from the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 
collected by Harold J. Spaeth.19 According to the theory that attention 
to a particular policy area is measured by whether the Court decides 
something in that area, we included all orally argued cases, whether 
 
 19. Supreme Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm (follow “The 
Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database” hyperlinks) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:215 
 
 
they resulted in signed or unsigned opinions, including per curium 
decisions and judgments. Memoranda, decrees, and split vote cases 
are excluded. Multiple docket numbers that the Justices include into a 
single case citation are counted only once. At times, some case 
citations represent multiple issues. When these issues span across 
different policy areas, they are counted once for each issue 
represented. Otherwise, they are only counted once in total. Table 1 
presents the eleven policy areas in the analysis, along with their mean 
number of cases and standard deviations from 1953 to 2000. Taking 
each policy area across all years, the means range from about 1.7 to 
nearly 35 cases, and the standard deviations range from 1.8 to nearly 
12. There is a great deal of variation both within and between policy 
areas. 
TABLE 1: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF NUMBER OF 
CASES AND SIGNAL INDEX ON THE SUPREME COURT’S AGENDA BY 
POLICY AREA 
 Number of Cases, 1953–2000  Signal Index, 1953–1995 
Policy Area Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Discrimination 24.19 9.76 1.01 .57 
First Amendment 12.42 6.40 .75 .33 
Privacy 1.71 1.87 .09 .12 
Criminal Rights 34.40 11.75 1.01 .53 
Labor 6.23 3.32 .16 .14 
Environment 1.90 1.81 .06 .07 
Economic Regulation 19.69 7.34 .49 .19 
Taxation 7.79 3.48 .21 .15 
Due Process & 
Government Liability 6.71 3.85 .20 .17 
Judicial Power 24.63 8.64 .53 .30 
Federalism 7.77 3.12 .26 .19 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Judicial Agenda Setting 225 
 
 
IV. MEASURING INDICATIONS OF THE JUSTICES’ PRIORITIES  
What constitutes an indication of the Justices’ priorities? There 
are a variety of different ways of measuring whether Justices care 
about a particular policy area: they can make a significant difference 
in policy to justify being published on the front page of the New York 
Times, they can alter precedent, they can write many separate 
opinions, they can declare a law unconstitutional, or they can reverse 
lower court decisions at high rates. We created a measure that 
incorporates all of these indications of the relative salience of a 
particular issue area to Justices, which we call the “signal index.” 
Since the activities indicating salience are each measured at the level 
of the policy area per year, policy areas that show a high number of 
these attributes relative to other years in the same policy area can be 
considered a priority by at least some subset of Justices. Moreover, 
no single indicator dominates the index because each indicator is 
standardized on a 0–1 scale for the index. Table 1 shows the means 
and standard deviations of the signal index from 1953–1995.20 It is 
clear from Table 1 that each policy area has a different range of 
values on this index. The policy areas of discrimination and 
criminals’ rights have the highest average on the signal index, with 
First Amendment, economic regulation, and federalism having 
middling average values, and with privacy and the environment at the 
low end.  
The above analysis provides information that is potentially highly 
valuable to sophisticated lawyers when deciding which cases to 
support. These measures are only a rough estimate of the other matter 
lawyers will be interested in: how to frame those future cases. The 
information we have gathered here, about judicial priorities, will 
directly aid lawyers in deciding whether to support cases in a 
particular policy area and will give clues about which legal 
arguments and which case facts will be appealing to the Justices in 
the future. The two natural questions that flow from our initial 
evidence that Justices send highly varied signals as to the cases they 
 
 20. Epstein and Knight’s measure of case salience, which is whether the case appeared on 
the front page of the New York Times measure, is only available until 1995. See Lee Epstein & 
Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000). 
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wish to hear in different policy areas are: First, do lawyers and 
litigant entrepreneurs bring more cases in those areas where signaling 
is high? Second, if so, does it also affect which type of arguments 
lawyers make when bringing those cases? 
V. CASE INCREASES IN RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL SIGNALS 
We anticipate that signals will lead to an increase in cases heard in 
the respective policy area, but not immediately. Following a judicial 
signal, it should take at least four to five years for a case to be tried, 
appealed, and ultimately brought to the Supreme Court.21 Cross-
sectional time series analysis (1953–1995) across all eleven policy 
areas shows that approximately four and five years after Justices 
signal their interest in a particular policy area, the Supreme Court 
hands down additional decisions in those areas. There is no impact on 
the agenda in the first three years after an increase in the signal index. 
To show this effect, we split the cases into two groups: those in 
which the signal index is above the mean and those in which the 
signal index is below the mean. Then, we compare the mean number 
of cases on the Court’s agenda four and five years after the signal 
index is either below or above the mean.  
 
 21. The median time interval between the filing and disposition at trial of civil cases in 
U.S. District Courts for the period ending September 30, 2004, is 21.1 months. Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, Table C-5: U.S. District Courts—Median Time Intervals from Filing 
to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During the 
12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2004 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/ 
appendices/c5.pdf. The median time interval between filing notice of appeal to disposition in 
the U.S. courts of appeals is 10.5 months. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table B-4: 
U.S. Courts of Appeals—Median Time Intervals in Cases Terminated After Hearing or 
Submission, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2004 (2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b4.pdf. Similar figures for the additional 
period for U.S. Supreme Court filing to disposition time interval are not available, but we 
would anticipate a somewhat similar time interval between Supreme Court filing and 
disposition, suggesting an approximate timeframe of four years.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/8
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TABLE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES ON THE SUPREME COURT’S 
AGENDA, FOUR AND FIVE YEARS AFTER SIGNAL INDEX IS BELOW 
OR ABOVE THE MEAN, 1953–1995 
Policy Area Signal Index 
Below Mean 
N Signal Index 
Above Mean
N Average 
Difference
Discrimination (48) 43.80 25 61.50 18 
17.70 
First Amendment (24) 22.83 23 30.00 20 7.17 
Privacy (4) 3.39 28 4.07 15 
0.67 
Criminal Rights (70) 69.76 25 77.11 18 
7.35 
Labor (12) 11.04 28 14.73 15 
3.70 
Environment (4) 3.24 29 5.50 14 
2.26 
Economic Regulation (40) 35.43 21 41.64 22 6.21 
Taxation (16) 13.84 25 16.56 18 
2.72 
Due Process and 
Government Liability (13) 12.04 25 16.33 18 4.29 
Judicial Power (49) 47.44 25 55.00 18 
7.56 
Federalism (15) 15.85 27 15.69 16 
-0.16 
Table 2 presents the average sum of cases four and five years after 
the signal index was either below or above the mean. For ease of 
interpretation, we added the number that represents twice the mean of 
each policy area in parentheses since we are reporting the effect of 
agenda change across two years. In every single policy area, with the 
exception of federalism, the number of cases on the agenda four and 
five years after the signal index was above the mean increases, and in 
some policy areas, the increase is quite dramatic. In discrimination, in 
the fourth and fifth year after Justices have signaled their interest, the 
average increase in the number of cases on the agenda over those two 
years is nearly eighteen additional cases more than when the signal 
index is below the mean, a 40% increase. This shows that there is a 
huge transformation of the agenda with regard to discrimination 
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when the Justices indicate four and five years before that 
discrimination is a priority. In the First Amendment, criminals rights, 
economic regulation, and judicial power areas, the average difference 
ranges from six to seven cases, or 11% to 31%. In those policy areas 
where the impact is not as great in absolute terms, it is nevertheless 
proportionally large, given the lower average number of cases in 
those policy areas.  
To check that this pattern or cycle is not just a function of 
Supreme Court case selection decisions, we ascertain whether the 
significant increases in Supreme Court cases in response to signals 
can be seen in a corresponding surge of cases that come through the 
litigation pipeline. This further analysis indicates that additional cases 
appear in the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the years before they reach 
the Supreme Court (three or four years after the Justices signaled 
their priorities). 
This secondary analysis was undertaken using Donald R. Songer’s 
United States courts of Appeals Database.22 The cases of the appeals 
courts do not actually represent all cases handed down by appeals 
courts, but rather represent a random sample of each circuit and year. 
Since our analysis requires that we consider a random sample of all 
cases within a year, we weighted the appeals courts cases by the total 
proportion of cases that were handed down that year. Weighting 
ensures that every case handed down within any single year has the 
same chance of being represented in the data as a case in any other 
year. The number of cases excludes cases that are decided again 
based on a remand from the Supreme Court. Therefore, the increase 
shown here is only an approximation of the effect, because it only 
includes a random sample of the cases.  
As before, in our analysis of Supreme Court cases, at the appeals 
court level, in every single policy area, there is an increase in the 
attention given to those policy areas that the Supreme Court has 
indicated as a priority. This increase happens exactly a year before 
the increase occurs at the Supreme Court, or three and four years 
after the Justices indicate that these policy areas are their priority. 
 
 22. Donald R. Songer, United States Courts Of Appeals Database Phase 1, 1925–1988, 
Inter-Univ. Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Res. (May 27, 1998), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ 
cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/02086.xml.  
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This evidence also supports the idea that due to its signals the 
Supreme Court has access to a better selection of cases, 
substantiating our claim that the Court is dependent on sophisticated 
political or legal entrepreneurs bringing cases that are good vehicles 
for making political and legal change.  
TABLE 3: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES ON THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS’ AGENDAS, THREE AND FOUR YEARS AFTER SIGNAL INDEX 
IS BELOW OR ABOVE THE MEAN, 1953–1988 
Policy Area Signal Index 
Below mean 
N Signal Index 
Above mean
N Average 
difference 
Discrimination  24.03 17 34.50 16 10.47 
First Amendment  5.86 16 11.15 17 5.29 
Privacy 1.01 24 2.34 9 1.33 
Criminal Rights  119.83 19 172.65 14 52.82 
Labor  36.50 18 38.17 15 1.67 
Economic Regulation  133.92 14 158.70 19 24.78 
Taxation  22.05 18 25.64 15 3.59 
Due Process & 
Government Liability  22.80 18 27.06 15 4.26 
Federalism  2.99 23 3.55 10 .56 
 
The one seeming exception to our evidence of increased cases 
following judicial signals of interest in an area is the policy area of 
federalism. However there is reason to expect different results in 
relation to federalism. Federalism is an issue that is often mentioned 
in each of the other policy areas. In fact, technically speaking, most 
cases must implicitly be recognized as falling within the jurisdiction 
of federal courts, which is a question about the balance of power 
between the federal and the state governments. Our prior analysis 
established that when Justices indicate that federalism is a priority, it 
has an impact on the number of cases in every other policy area that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:215 
 
 
are framed in terms of the balance of power between states and the 
federal government.23 This suggests that federalism is at least 
partially a mechanism of getting at other issues, and so it is not 
surprisingly that the general results do not apply to this issue area.  
Our results are mutually reinforcing with Baird’s (2004, 2007) 
findings that the additional cases we observe arising from signals are 
also more important from the perspective of amici participants and 
the Supreme Court Justices themselves than ordinary cases.24 For 
example, there are proportionally more amicus briefs filed for each of 
these cases at the Supreme Court, as well as proportionally more 
separate opinions written by the Justices. There are even 
proportionally more amicus briefs filed at the courts of appeals in the 
same years where we saw a surge of cases there, confirming that even 
the additional cases in the pipeline are more politically important than 
other cases heard by the courts of appeals. What this means is that 
cases in the system vary in their quantity and quality in ways that are 
perfectly consistent with the patterns at the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, the justices in the Circuit Courts of Appeals write 
additional concurring and dissenting opinions in those policy areas 
considered a priority by the Supreme Court Justices. This shows that 
not only can the Supreme Court Justices depend on extrajudicial 
actors to provide them with high quality cases, but they can also 
depend on lower court judges to provide them with various legal 
rationales that are then available to the Supreme Court Justices when 
they make their decisions.  
These findings corroborate our results above that indications of 
judicial priorities will lead to an increase in cases in each respective 
policy area. The results also largely discredit a potential 
counterargument that cases of equally high quality in all policy areas 
are always available to Supreme Court Justices. These findings also 
support the conclusion that lawyers and litigant entrepreneurs will 
adjust how they frame cases in response to the information provided 
in judicial signals. The following results provide support for the 
associated phenomenon that lawyers and litigant entrepreneurs also 
rely on signals to bring “harder” cases that divide the Justices and 
 
 23. See Baird & Jacobi, supra note 7.  
 24. BAIRD, supra note 7, at 128–45.  
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therefore create smaller majorities. Thus, indications that Justices 
consider a policy area a priority are more likely to result in an 
increase in the number of split decisions as compared to unanimous 
decisions in those same policy areas.  
VI. SIGNAL-INDUCED STRATEGIES IN LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
It is not only the Justices’ priorities that matter but also the 
Justices’ ideological preferences. The preferences of the most 
moderate Justices tend to matter most because both liberal and 
conservative litigants have to frame their arguments in such a way as 
to appeal to the Justice who they perceive is the median Justice. 
Litigation entrepreneurs’ aims in spending resources on sponsoring 
cases are to bring about a policy change that moves the status quo in 
the direction of their preferences. The more they pay attention to the 
cues from the Justices about their preferences, the more likely they 
will be successful. The argument here is that litigation inspired by the 
Court’s signals of the Court’s priorities, whether brought by liberal- 
or conservative-minded litigants, should be strategically framed so as 
to appeal to four of the most ideological friendly Justices, plus the 
most centrist Supreme Court Justice. Though groups do not want to 
risk a loss (a bad precedent could last a long time), choosing “easy” 
questions—those that might inspire agreeable but unanimous 
outcomes because they are so obvious—may not provide as much 
gain in policy. More “difficult” questions split the Justices into two 
separate coalitions; the outcome is sufficiently controversial so as to 
alienate some set of Justices. Strategically minded litigants should 
bring questions that will appeal to the moderate Justices, but since 
they have an interest in pushing the policy envelope, the answer that 
they are looking for may also alienate some set of Justices.  
Of course, in any one case, the litigants could get it wrong; public 
information about exactly where judicial preferences lie is not 
perfect. Adding to the problem of incomplete information, Justices’ 
preferences could change, or the targeted Justices might be replaced 
by the time that litigation reaches the Court, which can change the 
placement or the identity of the median Justice. Therefore, litigants 
could easily misjudge what the Justices will do. However, 
information about preferences, even when incomplete, reduces 
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uncertainty. Litigants will not frame the legal questions or case facts 
perfectly every time, but they have an incentive to craft their 
arguments with an eye to judicial preferences, as revealed in signals, 
as much as possible.  
The empirical implication of the incentive for litigants to favor 
more difficult cases is that indications of the Supreme Court’s policy 
priorities should bring about a higher rate of relatively close decisions 
four or five years later. In other words, if the litigants who are 
responding to the Supreme Court’s priorities are successful in 
framing litigation in such a way as to appeal to the ideologically 
friendly coalition, plus the moderate Justices, then more vote 
outcomes should be 5–4 or 6–3 when that litigation reaches the 
Court. Setting up the analysis in this way allows the identity of the 
median Justice to vary across years or even within the same year 
across policy areas. Thus, even though the median Justice is part of 
the theory, there is no reason to expect that the median Justice is 
perceived as the same person for all litigants or across all policy 
areas. Moreover, this analysis seeks to reveal the presence of overall 
patterns and therefore is not likely to be as affected by the inevitable 
mistakes that litigants will make in certain cases when they predict 
how certain Justices will vote on a particular issue.  
The evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that the cases that are 
inspired by the Court’s priorities four and five years later are much 
more likely to result in small majority coalitions of five or six. When 
Supreme Court Justices signal their interest in a particular policy 
area, there is an increase in unanimous decisions in every policy area, 
but the change in the average number of split decisions is greater. 
This is true in most but not all policy areas. The exceptions are the 
environmental and taxation cases as well as cases having to do with 
federalism and judicial power. This may be explained by the fewer 
number of cases overall in these policy areas, or by the fewer number 
of split decision cases in those policy areas. In other policy areas, the 
difference is substantial. For example, the policy areas of 
discrimination and economic regulation show a substantial impact 
among split decisions as compared with unanimous decisions. There 
is virtually no impact of the signals of the Justices’ priorities on the 
number of unanimous decisions in economic regulation, but an 
increase in the number of split decisions from about five cases, 
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compared with over nine cases on average after the Justices have 
signaled their interest in economic regulation.  
TABLE 4: AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNANIMOUS AND SPLIT DECISION 
CASES FOUR AND FIVE YEARS AFTER SIGNAL INDEX IS BELOW OR 
ABOVE THE MEAN 
 Unanimous Decisions Split Decisions (5–4 or 6–3) 
 Signal 
Index 
Below 
Mean 
Signal 
Index 
Above 
Mean 
Average 
Difference 
Signal 
Index 
Below 
Mean 
Signal 
Index 
Above 
Mean 
Average 
Difference
Discrimination 
7.60 11.44 3.84 5.64 12.33 6.69 
First 
Amendment 2.52 4.85 2.33 4.04 7.50 3.46 
Privacy 
.50 .80 0.30 .17 1.00 0.83 
Criminal 
Rights 
9.56 11.61 2.05 12.36 15.83 3.47 
Labor 
2.18 3.60 1.42 1.46 3.27 1.81 
Environment 
.62 2.07 1.45 .24 1.00 0.76 
Economic 
Regulation 8.00 8.77 0.77 4.67 9.18 4.51 
Taxation 
2.68 4.11 1.43 1.60 2.50 0.9 
Due Process & 
Government 
Liability 2.24 3.72 1.48 1.36 3.00 1.64 
Judicial Power 
11.64 14.78 3.14 6.04 7.33 1.29 
Federalism 
3.22 4.44 1.22 2.04 2.19 0.15 
 
The results support these theories, and so further corroborate the 
claim that litigants are at the source of these changes on the Court’s 
agenda. Not only is there an increase in the attention to policy areas 
that Justices care about, but the output of the Supreme Court has a 
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different character in the years that follow signals indicating the 
Justices’ priorities. This further substantiates the claim that the four- 
to five-year cycles of Court activity are a function of changes in 
litigation patterns. 
The implication of this finding is that divided decisions provide a 
chance for the median Justices to implement his or her preferences 
more precisely. For example, in making policy with regard to police 
searches, strategic litigation meant to appeal to the median Justice 
allows the median Justice to identify precisely the circumstances in 
which searches will or will not be allowed. Will they be allowed in 
circumstance X? The median can side with four of her more liberal 
colleagues and say no. Circumstance Y? In this case, the median can 
side with her more conservative counterparts and say yes. And so on. 
This allows the median Justice a great deal of discretion in 
discriminating among various conditions and on average results in 
policies that represent the median’s preferences more precisely. 
VII. SIGNAL-INDUCED ARGUMENTS IN LITIGATION: FEDERAL 
VERSUS STATE POWER 
Signals may even be more precise. Signaling is not limited to 
majority Justices: we also argue that dissenting coalitions on the 
Supreme Court have an incentive to signal potential litigants with 
specific information about how they would like to see future cases 
framed. Dissenting Justices may have an idea that if litigants were to 
reframe the case facts and the legal arguments in a similar kind of 
case, this may help them get one or a few extra Justices to vote in the 
dissent’s favor, allowing the previously dissenting Justice to form a 
new majority in a future case. We test this theory by examining 
signals from dissenting opinions asking future litigants to reframe the 
legal argument into a debate about federal powers versus states’ 
rights.  
Just as which Justice is the median can vary by issue, so too can 
the relative positions of the Justices vary according to whether an 
issue is decided on one basis or another. A majority may exist for a 
ruling in a specific policy area, such as discrimination, but at the 
same time a different majority may exist for the opposite outcome if 
the same issue were decided on the basis of a second relevant policy 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Judicial Agenda Setting 235 
 
 
dimension, such as federalism. A Justice may have strong preferences 
to see discrimination curtailed, but not at the expense of state power 
vis-a-vis federal power. That Justice will vote differently on a 
desegregation case, depending on which dimension is most salient. 
This creates the opportunity for another Justice, who was initially on 
the losing side of the case, to signal that future cases should be 
argued on the basis of federalism instead of the substantive policy 
area of discrimination. When litigants respond by bringing 
subsequent cases argued according to the signal, the initially 
dissenting Justice may then forge a new majority to achieve the 
opposing outcome. 
For the following analysis, we depend on Phase II of the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database, collected by James L. 
Gibson.25 This database provides information on the opinions on 
every case from 1953–1985, including whether the case was at least 
partially decided on the basis of the proper balance of power between 
the states and the federal government. The reliability of the coding 
for whether federalism is part of the basis for the decision is 88%. 
This is not a perfect reliability but it is likely that problems in the 
reliability of the coding only have an impact on random measurement 
error and therefore should make our inferences of the impact 
conservative.  
Federalism is a policy area in the analysis, but this policy area 
designation is not the same thing as deciding whether the balance of 
power between the states and the federal government is at issue in the 
case—which could happen in any policy area. Not all cases that are 
coded in the policy area of federalism have to do with the balance of 
power between the states and the federal government, such as 
territorial disputes between states. According to Gibson,  
this category focuses on the question of whether the nation or 
the state has authority in the area of police powers to promote 
the health, welfare, safety, and morals of the citizens. It also 
includes cases of federal pre-emption of state jurisdiction and 
 
 25. James L. Gibson, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, Phase II: 1953–
1993, Inter-Univ. Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Res. (Dec. 11, 1997), http://www,icpsr.umich. 
edu/cocoon/ICPSR/STUDY/06987.xml.  
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state court jurisdiction, disputes over whether there should be 
national or uniform rules of behavior, or whether states should 
be permitted to make their own rules.26 
Almost every case that the Supreme Court hears has an implicit 
federalism dimension because when the Supreme Court decides to 
hear it, the Justices must have decided that the case has federal 
jurisdiction. When there is an explicit federal-state powers issue that 
is relevant to the case's outcome, cases are coded positively as having 
implicated the legal question of federal versus state powers.  
The empirical tests of the federalism signaling theory show that 
when Justices write dissenting opinions that signal a preference for 
transforming the issue into a legal argument about federal versus state 
power, this results in an increase in the number of cases in that policy 
area that are decided on the basis of federal-state power. Cross-
sectional time series analysis (1953–1985) across all eleven policy 
areas shows that approximately six years after a dissenting opinion 
mentions that the relevant issue should have been the proper balance 
between state and federal powers, the Supreme Court hands down 
additional decisions that are decided on the basis of state-federal 
power in those areas. In the analysis presented in Table 5, we only 
included policy areas that had at least two dissenting opinions that 
mentioned federal-state power (when the majority opinion does not 
mention federalism). This reduces the number of policy areas from 
eleven to seven. In all policy areas except for two, when there is a 
signal in a dissenting opinion saying that the case should have been 
decided on the basis of federal-state power, there is an increase in the 
number of cases decided in that policy area on the basis of federal-
state power six years later.  
 
 26. Id. at 94. 
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CASES ON THE SUPREME COURT’S 
AGENDA DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF FEDERAL-STATE POWERS, SIX 
YEARS AFTER DISSENTING OPINION MENTIONS FEDERALISM AS THE 
ISSUE (WHEN THE PREVIOUS MAJORITY OPINION DOES NOT),  
1953–1985 
Policy Area 
No Dissent 
Mentioning 
Federalism*  
N 
Dissent 
Mentions 
Federalism* 
N 
Average 
Difference in 
Mean Number 
of Cases 
Discrimination 
4.28 18 5.33 9 1.05 
First Amendment .59 17 1.00 10 0.41 
Criminal Rights 
2.50 12 2.40 15 -0.1 
Economic Regulation 2.11 19 2.50 8 0.39 
Taxation 
1.22 23 2.00 4 0.78 
Judicial Power 
3.11 18 2.44 9 -0.67 
Federalism 
4.28 18 5.33 9 1.05 
* when majority does not mention the dispute between federal and state powers 
In other analysis, we tested the extent of the influence of the 
dissenting signals by examining the overall ideological position of 
the law in a given policy area before and after the signal-induced 
subsequent litigation.27 We find that signals from dissenting Justices 
seeking a move in a conservative direction not only prompt more 
cases to be heard that were argued on the basis of federal-state power, 
but also move the overall policy position of the issue area in a 
significantly conservative direction. Likewise, liberal dissents result 
in significant movements in a liberal direction. These results 
corroborate the theory that how cases are framed matters, and 
 
 27. Baird & Jacobi, supra note 7.  
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moreover illustrate the dependence of Justices on litigants who 
respond to the Justices’ signals.  
CONCLUSION 
This new research on judicial signaling and litigant 
responsiveness to such signals lends new insight into strategic 
judicial behavior, in particular how Supreme Court Justices shape the 
Court’s agenda years ahead of time. Supreme Court Justices can 
summon cases onto their agendas well before the certiorari process 
begins, by communicating their priorities and preferences to potential 
litigants. But despite this previously unrecognized power, Supreme 
Court Justices are still dependent on extrajudicial actors for access to 
a sufficient number of well-framed cases in order to make 
comprehensive policy in areas that the Justices consider to be high 
priorities. Judicial policy-making power depends on policy 
entrepreneurs or other litigants who systematically respond to the 
priorities and preferences of Supreme Court Justices. This in turn 
drives systematic cyclical patterns on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
agenda that have previously gone unnoticed, challenging the 
conventional view that Justices must wait passively for the cases that 
are brought to them. By manipulating this influence, the Court can 
largely overcome the institutional weakness that they have to wait for 
cases and controversies to be brought before them by others. 
More broadly, these results suggest that there is a previously 
unexplored bounty contained within much judicial expression. 
Judicial signals are not simply a means of overcoming the 
institutional constraint that judges must rely on others to initiate 
cases; these results indicate that judicial signaling is also a means of 
mitigating other constraints on judicial behavior, particularly norms 
of judicial circumspection and disinterest in as yet unheard cases. 
Judicial signals are a means by which judges reveal their preferences, 
their strength of feeling about case outcomes, and their ambitions. 
Litigant entrepreneurs are able to exploit this information in weighing 
their case prospects and strategies, but information is also being 
provided to professional observers of judicial behavior. Through such 
observations, we have additional proof that justices are often 
sophisticated strategists, able to shape the law not simply through 
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deciding the outcome of cases brought by others, but through 
defining which issues should be heard in the first place.  
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